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DEBATING "BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS" SYMPOSIUM
De-constitutionalizing 
individual rights beyond 
the state?
Democracy and universality below and between 
human rights 
With its translation into English, Anne Peters’ “Beyond 
Human Rights” provokes reactions from a wider scholarly 
community that does not necessarily share her doctrinal 
methods, theoretical commitments or underlying political 
philosophy. Zoran Oklopic thus reads her work critically as a 
call for a “ius cosmopoliticum” based on “normative 
individualism”, as a liberal legalism which empowers the 
bourgeois to effectively enforce individual – read: corporate 
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– property rights through investment arbitration but 
ultimately fails to protect consular rights of Latino migrants 
in US courts. In this post, however, I would like to put 
forward a different reading: I argue that introducing a layer 
of “simple” rights de-constitutionalizes individual rights, 
thereby opening a space for collective self-determination of 
citoyens and for legal scholarship and political contestation 
beyond universalist claims inherent in human rights. 
“Simple” individual rights and collective self-
determination 
Peters’ conception includes two layers of individual rights 
embedded within a normative hierarchy: higher-ranking, 
constitutional-type human rights, and lower-ranking, 
“simple” rights of ordinary international law (p. 3, 388 in the 
German version). This opens up a new doctrinal category 
and a new register of argumentation: UNESCO, to use 
Peters’ example, can still argue that “sport” is an individual 
right but does not need to claim that there is a human right
to sport. This is desirable because simple rights help avoid 
the inflation and banalization of human rights. But Peters 
has a second reason, based on a democratic logic: Simple 
rights are subject to legislative amendment by democratic 
majorities, whereas constitutional rights are protected to 
some extent by court-enforced supermajority requirements 
(p. 395). Downgrading individual rights to “simple status” de-
constitutionalizes them and brings them back into the realm 
of democratic politics and representative institutions. 
Reversibility of simple rights is ultimately a demand of 
majoritarian democracy, which rests on political equality of 
citoyens, not bourgeois.
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But does this argument from domestic constitutionalism 
hold beyond the state? I want to make two points here, a 
first on collective self-determination and a second on 
universality. Firstly, can simple rights help balance rights and 
democratic politics in international law? Peters states that 
simple rights can be amended or repealed by treaty or 
custom but does not elaborate mechanisms or source 
aspects (398). International law in general is relatively hard 
to amend or repeal, which poses a problem for domestic 
democracy, at least at first sight. Is there a difference 
between “simple” international rights and human rights in 
this respect? Both are hard to amend – at worst, a single 
state can prevent amendment of a multilateral treaty – and 
international lawmaking procedures do not differentiate 
between simple and human rights as such. But a closer look 
reveals some nuances that would warrant further research.
Compare reversibility of human rights and investors’ rights, 
as discussed in Evelyne Lagrange’s post: While human rights 
treaties are hardly ever denounced formally, several Latin 
American states have recently terminated Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) or withdrawn from the ICSID 
convention after fundamental political changes, and 
countries like India are revising their BITs. Still, doubts 
remain: even terminated BITs linger on for as long as a 
decade, and interpretations of “simple” investors’ rights by 
non-representative arbitral tribunals are hard to correct by 
any legislative mechanism, even if democratic majorities on 
all sides agree on amendments. Thus, even if investors’ rights 
are simple rights, the institutional and doctrinal 
consequences are yet to be drawn to differentiate them 
from human rights. Peters own work on “dual democracy”
indicates her concern in this respect, and it would be 
interesting to see these two constitutionalist strands linked.
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“Simple” rights and the universality of international law  
My second point is that simple rights open a discursive 
space below and between human rights which allows 
scholarly and political arguments about individual rights that 
do not per se carry the same universalist claim that is 
inherent in human rights. Universality claims, as Sundhya 
Pahuja argues, have their own politics that risk to 
internationalize parochial – often “Western” – concepts and 
to relegate its Others to the particularistic, the national. But 
if not all individual rights are universal human rights, it 
becomes politically possible to regulate simple rights 
differently. BITs can differ just as much as domestic property 
rights can vary, from relatively strong constitutional 
protection in the US, via the socially-bound, normatively-
shaped German right to property, to the fading right to 
property in India. Arguably, simple rights can be a terrain for 
what Pahuja calls “empty universalism” – a universalism with 
no fixed, but negotiable content that could be a common 
ground for scholarly and political debate.
Indeed, Peters herself hints at her sympathy with political 
conceptions of rights as put forward by Cristine Lafont (415). 
Yet, doubts remain: Would the two-layer approach not just 
shift the debate to the delineation of simple and human 
rights? Would UNESCO not still want to claim a universal 
human right of sport, instead of just a simple right? Would 
de-constitutionalizing individual rights not risk the 
emancipatory, counter-hegemonic potential also inherent in 
universal rights, if the claims of the Others become 
categorized as “simple” rights (cf. the debate on whether 
African, “third generation” rights are really human rights)?
Page 4 of 7De-constitutionalizing individual rights beyond the state? | Völkerrechtsblog
05.10.2017https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/de-constitutionalizing-individual-rights-beyond-the-state/
Information rights as research agenda beyond human 
rights 
The issues of democracy and universality become 
particularly evident in another area of rights that is largely 
absent from the book but that seems promising for further 
research: transparency, access to information, and 
competing information rights, such as privacy and data 
protection. Peters’ earlier claim that freedom of information 
is more than a “simple” right may have barred inclusion in 
this book, but information rights nevertheless illustrate well 
the complex interplay of fundamental rights, simple rights, 
democracy and universality. As domestic freedom of 
information legislation surged, international law, too, has 
increasingly granted simple transparency rights to 
individuals in environmental law, WTO law and finance. The 
World Bank’s secondary law stipulates such a right for 
everyone regardless of personal interest in the matter, even 
without consent of the state concerned, and makes this right 
enforceable in a quasi-judicial Access to Information Appeals 
Board. This emerging international institutional law of 
information is full of tensions, not least when it comes to 
balancing access to information with privacy, but it has some 
potential to improve democratic deliberation and 
accountability within and beyond the nation state – or even 
in helping to bring it about. This is a dynamic field in which 
rights evolve as technology and political preferences 
develop. In this situation, fundamental rights provide a 
bottom line, but simple rights have important functions 
beyond concretizing individual entitlements and duties: 
rather than constitutionalizing and universalizing today’s 
solutions, they remain open for experimentation and 
revision as societies learn and deliberate how they want to 
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balance transparency and openness with privacy and data 
protection in the future.
Michael Riegner is researcher at Humboldt University Berlin. 
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